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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

CONFLICT OF LAWS AS TO CONTRACTS: MINNESOTA DECISIONS
By HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK*
the question of the proper law to govern the rights
and obligations of parties to contracts which are related in
fact to more than one jurisdiction is one which frequently arises,
there is no question of conflict of laws as to which there is more
confusion. Not only do the courts of different jurisdictions,, and
even the same court in different cases, apply apparently inconsistent principles in the decision of cases which raise this question, but the authors of text-books and the leading teachers of the
subject are unable to agree as to the principle which should be
applied.' The object of the present paper is to examine the decisions of the Minnesota supreme court on this question.
In the case of Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co.,'
it was held that rights acquired under the laws of another state
would be enforced here, though our laws gave no similar right,
unless the enforcement of such right would be contrary to the
public policy of Minnesota. That was an action in tort, but the
court decided it by applying the rule which admittedly applied to
contract rights. The court added that all matters pertaining to
the remedy were governed by the law of the state where the action
was brought. The question of what is right and what is remedy
is outside of the scope of this paper. It may be noted, however,
that the statute of frauds is held to pertain to the validity of the
contract and not merely the remedy for its breach.8
Apparently no Minnesota case has raised the question of what
law should govern the capacity of parties to enter into a contract.4 Nor have we any decisions as to the law which should
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'Story, Conflict of Laws, 8th Ed., "325; Wharton, Conflict of Laws,
3rd Ed., 858-951; Minor, Conflict of Laws, S60; Westlake, Private International Law, 7th Ed. 302; Dicey, Conflict of Laws, 3rd Ed., 572; Beale,
What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 Harv. Law Rev. 260,
270; Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts, 30 Yale Law Journal

655, 673.

2(1883) 31 Minn. 11, 16 N. W. 413.
3Halloran v. Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co., (1917) 137 Minn. 141,
162 N. W. 1082.
4In Buckley v. Humason, (1892) 50 Minn. 195, 52 N. W. 385, the
right of a real estate' broker doing business in Chicago, but not having
the required license, to recover a commission earned there for procuring
an exchange of Chicago property for Minnesota property was decided
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govern the formalities with which the parties must comply to give
-their agreement legal validity, but there are dicta that the law of
the place where the contract is made should govern that question. 5 In Halloranv. Jacob Schnzidt Brewing Co., the statute of
frauds was held to affect the formal validity of the contract, and
not merely the remedy. The contract involved in that case was a
guaranty of a lease of Iowa real estate, made and to be performed in Iowa, so that all that the court had to decide was that
the form of the writing must be governed either by the law of
the place of making or of performance.
There is no manifest tendency to make any distinction between
the law governing the validity of a contract and that governing
its interpretation or performance. In Johnson. z. Nelson the
court says that "the general rule is that as to matters of performance the laws of the place of performance govern." In that case
the plaintiff-had been hired in Minnesota by defendant and later
was sent to Wisconsin where he was injured. The court decided
that the action for his injuries was a tort action and governed by
the Wisconsin compensation act, regardless of the place of the
contract of employment. We find similar general statements that
the validity of contracts is to be determined by the law of the
place of performance. 8 We also find the court stating: "It is
settled law that the place of the contract regulates its validity, interpretation, and the nature of its obligation;)' O and again, "All
substantive questions as to the rights and liabilities of the parties
must be determined by the law of the place of contract."10
There is a distinction drawn between the law which governs
the personal rights and obligations of the parties to a contract and
that which governs the effect of the contract on the title to property. In Swedish-American Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank" an
on the theory that the making of the contract for the commission was
an uhlawful act, not on the theory that the absence of a license made
the broker incompetent to contract for a commission.
-,Thompson-Houston Electric Co. v. Palmer, (1892) 52 Minn. 174,
53 N. W 1137; Swedish-American National Bank v. First National Bank
(1903) 89 Minn. 98, 94 N. W. 218.
G(1917) 137 Minn. 141, 162 N. W 1082.
7(1915) 128 Minn. 158, 150 N. W. 620.
sSeamon v. Christian Brothers Mill Co., (1896) 66 Minn. 205, 68
N. W 1065; Ames v. Benjamin, (1898) 74 Minn. 335, 77 N. NV. 230;
Swedish-American Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, (1903) 89 Minn. 98,
W. 218.
94 N.
9
Schultz v. Howard, (1895) 63 Minn. 196, 65 N. W. 363.
0
' Culver v. Johnson, (1915) 131 Minn. 75, 154 N. W 739.
11(1903) 89 Minn. 98, 94 N. W-218.
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attack was made on warehouse receipts issued by a Minnesota
corporation on its grain in its own warehouses, located in four
different states, as a pledge of the grain to secure notes payable
in Massachusetts. The court held that, although the principal
contract was governed by the law of Massachusetts, the validity
of the pledge must be determined by the law of the place where
the grain was located, so that it was valid as to the grain situated
in states having statutes making such pledges valid, and invalid
as to the grain in states where there was no similar statute. This
case is apparently contra to In re Paige v. Sexsmith Lumber
Co.," which held that a voluntary assignment for the benefit of
creditors, valid where made, transfers the title to personal property wherever it may be situated. The court stated that "This
is admitted by the relator to be the law, but it is claimed that the
Wisconsin assignment is opposed to the express requirements of
our statute, and, by the very terms of our law, is void for noncompliance with it." The two cases may be distinguished on the
ground that the objection in the earlier case was failure to file the
assignments in Minnesota, which is a matter of form, and the
later case concedes that as to matters of form the law of the place
of making may govern. In Finnes v. Selover, Bates & Co.,"3 and
Walsh v.Selover, Bates & Co., 4 it was held that Minnesota contracts for the sale of Colorado land were governed by Colorado
law only as to their effect on the title to the land, and could be
forfeited by the vendor for non-payment of the purchase money
only in the manner permitted by the Minnesota statute. In Clement v. Willett"1 it was held that Minnesota law governed the obligation to the mortgagee of the grantee who accepted a deed conveying Iowa land whereby the grantee assumed the payment of
the mortgage, the court finding that the contract of assumption
was made and performable in Minnesota. In Hewitt v. Dredge8
and Merchants State Bank v. Sunset Orchard Land Co.,' 7 recovery was allowed under the Minnesota law on notes executed
and payable in Minnesota secured by mortgages on land outside
of the state, though the law of the place where the mortgaged
lands were situated would not have permitted the recovery.
12(1883)

31 Minn. 136, 16 N. W. 700.

13(1907) 102
14(1909) 109
15(1908) 105
16(1916) 133
17(1924) 158

Minn. 334,
Minn. 136,
Minn. 267,
Minn. 171,
Minn. 108,

113
121
117
157
196

N.
N.
N.
N.
N.

W.
W.
W.
W.
W.

883.
627.
491.
1080.
963.
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The question whether the acceptance of a note given by a
debtor to a creditor is payment of the antecedent debt was raised
8
in Thonipson-Houston Lumber Co. v. Palmer."
This question
has sometimes been treated as though it were a question of the
performance or discharge of the antecedent Contract,0 but the
Minnesota court properly treated it as a question of the interpretation of the contract for the giving of the note.
In Kolliner v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,20 plaintiff, a resident of Minnesota, claimed, as damages for failure to deliver a
telegram sent from Montana to Washington, expenses incurred
which he could recover under a Minnesota statute but not under
the common law.. Defendant (appellant) argued that the Minnesota statute could not apply since the contract was neither made
nor to be performed here. Plaintiff made no argument as to the
law which should -govern. The supreme court merely remarked
that: "The contract was made in Montana and there was no pleading or proof as to the statutes of that state." In view of the contentions of the parties we cannot accept this case as authority for
the rule that the measure of damages for breach of a contract is
governed by the law of the place where it is made, rather than by
the law of the place where it is to -be performed.
These decisions indicate that, in general, all questions on
which depend the rights and obligations of parties to contracts
are to be decided by what has been aptly termed "the proper law
of the contract" 21 or, as the Minnesota court has phrased it, by
"lex -loci contractus (referring to the place of the seat of the contract, as distinguished from the place where it may casually hap22
pen to have been signed.)"1
In several cases the court has stated or intimated that the contract is governed by the law of the place where it was made, but
in most of such cases there has been no controversy as to the law
which should apply, or the controversy has been between the application of the domestic or foreign law.2 There is one case in
18(1892) 52 Minn. 174, 53 N. W. 1137.
IsDunnell's Minnesota Digest, Conflict of Laws 1532; Tarbox v. Childs,
(1896) 165 Mass. 408, 43 N. E. 124.
20(1914) 126 Minn. 122, 147 N. W. 961.
2
'lDicey, Conflict of Laws, 3rd Ed., 572.

22Thompson-I-ouston Electric Co. v. Palmer, (1892) 52 Minn. 174,
53 N.
23 W. 1137.
Reiff v. Bakken. (1887) 36 Minn. 333, 31 N. W. 348; Midland Co.
v. Broat, (1892) 50 Minn. 562; Fiske v. Lawton, (1913) 124 Minn. 85,
144 N. W.. 455; Kolliner v. Western Union Telegraph Co., (1914) 126
Minn. 122, 147 N. W. 961.
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which it was decided, against a contention that the law of the
place of performance should govern, that the validity of a clause
limiting the liability of a carrier to an agreed valuation was to be
24
determined by the law of the place where the contract was made.
The question first came before the court in Powers Mercantile Co.
v. Wells Fargo & Co., 25 in which the goods had been shipped from
Chicago and were destroyed in a wreck which occurred in Illinois.
The case was argued by both sides on the theory that the law of
Illinois governed, and the court stated that the case was to be determined by the law of Illinois "where the contract was made."
The question came before the court again in Porteous v. Adams
Express Co., 28 where the shipment was from New York to Pennsylvania and there was no proof as to where the loss occurred.
Plaintiff's counsel made no argument as to the law which should
govern, contending only that the evidence showed there was no
agreement to limit liability. Carpenter v. United States Express
Co., 27 involved a limitation of liability for an express shipment
from New York to Minneapolis. Counsel for plaintiff argued
that the question was not to be determined by the law of New
York, contending that liability for an interstate shipment was governed by .the Hepburn Act, or, if not, that the proof of receipt
by the carrier and failure to deliver to the consignee made a prima
facie case against the carrier which could be rebutted only by
proof that the loss occurred in a jurisdiction under whose laws
the contract was valid. Defendant relied on the case of Porteous
v. Adams Express Co.,2" as determining that the law of New
York controlled and the court followed that case, with the statement that plaintiff's argument that the law of the place of loss governs an interstate shipment was against the weight of authority.
"A contract of carriage of goods from one country to another
The
is governed by the laws of the place where it is made."12
it
governed,
loss
of
place
of
the
law
court added that even if the
would not help plaintiff since there was no proof as to where the
loss occurred. The court did not discuss, nor attempt to distinguish the Minnesota cases which had stated or held that the
24
Carpenter v. United States Exp. Co., (1912) 120 Minn. 59, 139
N. W. 154.

93 Minn. 143, 100 N. W. 735.
115 Minn. 281, 132 N. W. 296.
27(1912) 120 Minn. 59, 139 N. W. 154.
28(1911) 115 Minn. 281, 132 N. W. 296, supra note 26.
29
Quoted from 9 Cyc. 682.
25(1904)
28(1911)
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law of the place of performance,, as that presumably intended by
the parties, should govern contracts relating to other subjects.
In Stahl v. MitchelP0 it was held that the Pennsylvania statute
for the appointment of the successor of an assignee for benefit of
creditors became part of the contract, which was made in Pennsylvania, so that the successor appointed under that statute could
convey good title to land belonging to the assignor which was situated in Minnesota, though the statute could not, of itself, vest
such power in the assignee. The court said:
"The law of the jurisdiction in which the parties to a contract
reside, and in which it is executed, especially if it is to be performed within that jurisdiction, is usually, so far as it affects the
substance of the contract, to be deemed a part of it."
The first attempt of the court to state a principle by which
the law governing a contract could be determined was in the case
of Thompson-Houston Electric Co. v. Palher.3' The question
involved was whether a nofe executed by a debtor and delivered
to the creditor was taken in payment of the antecedent debt. The
note was executed while the debtor was casually in Missouri, and
was delivered to the creditor in Illinois. By the law of the latter
state, the giving of the note was prima facie a payment of the
antecedent debt; by the law of Minmesota it was not. The court
might well have-held that the contract to give and accept the note,
which <was the contract whose interpretation was involved, was
made and performed in Illinois, though the note itself was executed elsewhere, but it did not distinguish between that contract
and the contract embodied in the note. It held that the law of
the contract was "prima facie that which the parties intended to
apply," and that iere they presumably intended that the law of
Illinois should apply. In that case the controversy was whether
the question-was one of remedy, so that the Minnesota law would
apply, and the court also said: "Whoefr contracts in a country
is presumed to know its law, and whatever he does not express
plainly he refers to the interpretation of that law."
In McKibben v. Ellingson32 a debtor who resided, conducted
his business and kept all his property in North Dakota, executed,
while in Minnesota, an assignment to a Minnesota assignee for
the benefit of creditors. The assignment was recorded as required
-by the North Dakota statute, but not in conformity to the Minne80(1889) 41 Minn. 325, 43 N. W 385.
1(1892) 52 Minn. 174, 53 N. W 1137.
32(1894), 58 Minn. 205, 59 N. W. 1003.
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sota statute. In ruling on the objection that the assignment was
invalid because it did not comply with the law of the place where
it was made, the court held that the assignment was not made
effectual till it was recorded in North Dakota and was to all intents and purposes a North Dakota contract, so that it was unnecessary to decide what law would govern a contract made in one
state and performable in another.
3 3
was an action on notes dated in Chicago
Schultz v. Howard
and payable at "Globe National Bank." The issue was whether
the liability of maker and endorsers at the time of execution was
joint or joint and several. No law of Illinois was pleaded, but
counsel for plaintiff in his brief referred to a statute of that
state making all joint obligations joint and several. The court
held that, in the absence of an allegation to the contrary, it must
presume the law of Illinois was the same as that of Minnesota
but added:
"Assuming that the Globe National Bank, at which the notes
were payable, is in Illinois, this statute, if pleaded, would have
been decisive of the case, for it is settled law that the place of the
contract regulates its validity, interpretation and the nature of
its obligation."
Clement v. Willett 34 involved the liability of a grantee, who
had assumed a mortgage on the property, to the holder of the
mortgage. The deed was between Minnesota residents, and executed here, but conveyed land located in Iowa. The court held
that, since the contract of assumption was silent as to place of
performance, it is presumed that it is to be performed in the place
where it was made. "It does not appear that the parties intended
that the validity of the obligation should be determined by the
laws of Iowa, instead of the laws of Minnesota."
In Walsh v. Selover, Bates & Co., 35 the question whether -the
law of the place of execution controlled was squarely presented.
A resident of North Dakota had contracted to buy, from a resident of Minnesota, lands in Colorado. The negotiations for the
contract were conducted in Minnesota and all payments, except
the taxes, were to be made here, but the contract was signed at
the purchaser's residence in North Dakota. In the earlier case
of Finnes v. Selover, Bates & Co.,30 the court had held that a similar contract executed in Minnesota was governed by the Minne33(1895)
34(1908)
35(1909)
36(1907)

63 Minn.
105 Minn.
109 Minn.
102 Minn.

196.
267,
136,
334,

65 N. W. 363.
117 N. W. 491.
121 N. W. 627.
113 N. W. 883.
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sota statute relating to forfeiture for the purchaser's failure to
make payments as agreed. In the later case it was held that:
"The fact that the contract, after the terms thereof had been
agreed-upon in this state, was subsequently reduced to writing
and mailed to Walsh at his residence in North Dakota, and by
him there signed and returned to Bates in Minneapolis, does not
make it a North Dakota contract."
A similar question arose in True v. Northern Pac. R. Co.,37
where'the purchaser negotiated in Washington for the purchase
from the railroad of several tracts of its lands located in that
state. The contracts had to be approved by the railroad's land
commissioner in Minnesota before they became binding. Thereafter they were forwarded to the agent in Washington who delivered them to the purchaser. The court held that the contracts
were Washington contracts and the Minnesota statute regulating
forfeitures did not apply. The court stated that the place of approval would have been the place where the contract was made
except for the provision for formal execution and delivery thereafter in Washington.
Goedhoird v. Folstad38 was an action by the endorsees of notes
given for the purchase price of Texas land. The plaintiffs, appealing from an order denying their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict for defendant, argued that the notes
were Texas contracts and that an instruction under the Minnesota law that a provision for attorney's fee and increased interest
if they were not paid at maturity caused a forfeiture of all interest was erroneous. Defendants, on that point, merely stated the
error, i, any, was harmless, since the jury found plaintiffs were
not due-course holders. The supreme court held that the evidence established as a matter of law that plaintiffs were duecourse holders, but held that the notes, since they were executed
in Minnesota and delivered here, and specified no place of payment were Minnesota contracts, though they were on printed
forms which bore a Texas date line.
Several cases have considered the law governing usury. In
Smith v. Parsons 9 the notes were executed in Minnesota and secured by mortgage on Minnesota lands, and were payable in Connecticut. The court held that an express stipulation that the law
of Minnesota should govern was valid. In other cases the court
37(1914) 126 Minn. 72, 147 N. W 948.
38(1923) 156 Minn. 453, 195 N. W 281.
39(1893) 55 Minn. 520, 57 N. W 311.
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has applied the law of the place of payment, rather than the law
of the place of making and of the situs of the security ;10 the law
of the situs of the security rather than the law of the place of
making and of payment ;41 and the law of the place of making and
payment rather than the law of the situs of the security.42 The
last case is the only one which applied a law under which the contract was invalid, and it should be noted that it would have been
usurious also under the law of the situs of the security, the only
question being the effect of the invalidity. The earlier cases are
squarely based on the intent of the parties, such intent being implied where not expressed. In Green v. Northwestern Trust
Co., 43 the court said that if the intent was not expressed, the

court must find the presumed intent which determines the governing law, and that there was a strong presumption the intent
was to contract under a law making the contract valid. The case
of Pattersonv. Winan 4 does not mention the intent of the parties. There is no intimation in these cases that the law governing usury is any different from the law governing other features
of the contract.
It is obvious that we cannot deduce from these cases that
either the law of the place where the contract was made, or the
law of the place of performance, is the proper law of the contract
in all cases. However desirable it might be from a theoretical
standpoint, and to give certainty to the law, the experience of our
court, as that of other courts, has evidently shown that neither
rule is sufficiently flexible to meet the diverse situations that
arise, that a rigid application of either would require us to pay too
high a price for certainty.
It might, perhaps, be argued with fair success that all the
cases may be harmonized on the principle that the law of the contract is that with reference to which the parties intended to contract. But, aside from the theoretical objections to the adoption
of intent as an invariable criterion," 5 it furnishes but little assistance in most of the cases. As said by the Minnesota supreme
court:
40

Ames v. Benjamin, (1898) 74 Minn. 335, 77 N. W. 230; Jenkins
v. Union
Savings Association, (1916) 132 Minn. 19, 155 N. W. 765.
4
lGreen v. N. W. Trust Co., (1914) 128 Minn. 30, 150 N. W. 229.
2
4 Patterson v. Wyman, (1919) 142 Minn. 70, 170 N. W. 928.
43(1914) 128 Minn. 30, 150 N. W. 229.
44(1919) 142 Minn. 70, 170 N. W. 928.
45See Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 Harvard Law Rev. 260.
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"In a search for the actual intent of the parties when none is
expressed, there is an element of legal jugglery. Usually parties
to transactions of this nature, referable to one state or another,
or in part to one state and in part to another, have no unexpressed
but -actual intent as to the law which shall control. The question
of what law governs does not suggest itself to them.,"'
In addition, we have the objection that, to permit the parties
to select a law under which their contracts vill be valid, permits
them in many cases to evade the policy of the law, which otherwise would control, to refuse enforcement to the particular agreement. -That objection is often met by denying recognition to the
intent of the parties when that is merely to evade the policy of the
law. The general result of such reasoning is that in cases where
the parties have expressed no intent, and probably had none, the
court presumes an intent to be governed by the law which the
court thinks, for reasons which may not be disclosed in the
opinion, ought to apply; whereas in cases where the parties have
foreseen the difficulty and expressed their intent as to the law
which should govern, such intent is often disregarded as an attempt to evade the proper law of the contract. We are still
given-no principle to determine what is the proper governing law
which the parties are presumed to apply, and which they cannot
evade by expressing an intent to be governed by a different law.
To say that- the intent of the parties shall govern, provided their
intent is not merely to evade the proper law, only presents the
original problem in a different form.
But, assuming we cannot discover some principle that will decide all cases, it is not necessary that the law on this subject be
left in the state of confusion indicated by our court in its opinion
in'Seamans v. -ChristianBrothers Mill Co.,47 in which the court
stated that it is a general rule that a contract made in one state
will -be enforced in another; that it is also a general rule that
where a contract is entered into in one state, to be performed in
a certain other state, its validity will be determined by the law of
the latter state; that usually where these two rules come in conflict, there is little more than a question of determining the intention of parties as to the governing law; but that cases arise where
they are not at liberty to select the law they choose-thus giving
us four inconsistent and often conflicting rules without any indication as to the situations in which each is to be applied. If we
46Greene v. N. W Trust Co., (1914) 128 Minn. 30, 36, 150 N. NV. 229.
47(1896) 66.Minn. 205, 68 N. W. 1065.
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cannot find one rule which may be satisfactorily applied in all
cases, we may obtain the desired certainty in the law by determining the conditions which call for the application of each of the
different rules.
A natural explanation for the failure to evolve any rule to
solve all of these cases is that they present different legal questions which require different solutions to make the law protect
the different interests concerned. The validity of a contract depends, not on one legal factor, but on several. There must be an
agreement between the parties, often it must be in a particular
form, it must call for performance which public policy permits.
There is nothing in the nature of these factors which would make
it desirable that each should be governed by the same law.
Whether the act of entering into a contract is permitted or prohibited ought to be governed by the law of the place where the
act occurs. For example, the validity of an agreement made on
Sunday ought to depend on the law oi the place where it is made,
since that law alone is concerned with the observance of Sunday
in that jurisdiction. Whether the act which the agreement requires to be done is permitted or prohibited ought to be determined by the law of the place where it is to be done. For example, a contract made in Indiana to hold a prize fight in Illinois.
ought not to be upheld if the law of Illinois prohibits prize fights.
It may be argued that in such a case the law of Indiana would
govern but that Indiana law would not sustain a contract to perform an act which would be illegal by the law of the place where
it was to be done. But, if that question comes before the Minnesota court, our court ought not to consider itself bound by the
Indiana decisions as to the validity of such a contract. Whether
the agreement is in the form required to make it legally binding
is a question which is generally referred to the law of the place
where the contract was made, though it would seem there need
be no objection to permitting the use of any form which is recognized by some other law which, for other reasons, governs other
features of the contract.
A question analogous to the formal validity of a contract but
which, in some cases, may require a different solution is the question of the effect which the law attaches to certain acts in determining whether there was an agreement or whether the parties
are bound as though they had agreed. How shall we select the law
which ought to govern an attempted acceptance or withdrawal of
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an offer, or the presumptions which arise from other acts of the
parties? Clearly, if there is any fact to indicate that the parties
had in mind any particular law when'they performed the act
whose effect we are trying to determine, that law ought to be applied: In the absence of any such indication, we would be justified in applying the law of the place of contract.
The interpretation of a contract may involve two very different processes, the ascertainment of the meaning of the language
used by the parties and the supplementing of the language to
cover situations not foreseen and provided for. The first process
calls for the application of the law with which the draftsman of
the instrument was familiar, especially if the question depends on
the meaning of terms defined by that law and the draftsman was a
lawyer.. The second process presents a more difficult problem;
we cannot say the parties intended to adopt any particular law;
if they had foreseen the situation they Vould probably have expressed their agreement with reference thereto. Any provision
supplied by law must be more or less arbitrary, and the choice of
the law which shall supply that provision must likewise be arbitrary. It is probable that with reference to most of the different
questions that arise in actions on contracts related to different
jurisdictions, there will be situations in which no particular law
is clearly indicated, and the choice will have to be made by rules
adopted largely for convenience and certainty. Perhaps our express shipment cases 48 may be justified on the ground that a release of a carrier's liability ought to have the same force during
the entire shipment, though it passes through several states, and,
therefore, we will select the law of the place of shipment as the
governing law in spite of the fact that the policy underlying the
law as to the validity of such a release is as much the concern of
each state through which the shipment passes as it is of the state
-where the contract is entered into.
Where negotiable instruments are involved, the necessity for
a certain and definite rule whose applicability can be ascertained
from the face of the instrument probably requires different treatment from that accorded to other contracts. Certain rules, even
48Powers Mercantile Co. v. Wells Fargo & Co., (1904) 93 Minn.
143, 100 N. W. 735; Porteous v. Adams Exp. Co., (1911) 115 Minn. 281,
132 N. W. 296; Carpenter v. United States Exp. Co., (1912) 120 Minn.
59, 139 N. W. 154.

510
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though they are arbitrary, will be applied to such instruments in
circumstances which otherwise would call for different treatment.
It is conceded that the solution of this perplexing problem
above suggested is not a simple one, but calls for a system even
more complex than here indicated. But it is better to have a
frank recognition of the complexities of the situation and a limitation of the decision of each case to the particular question
thereby presented than to have, what has apparently been common
in the past, a group of rules, each apparently simple in itself and
stated as though it applied to all cases, which are inconsistent with
each other and which are each, at times, applied to the solution of
cases without any. indication why that particular rule, rather than
another, should be chosen. The courts must make a choice between these rules, and if the decisions will tell us the basis on
which the choice is made, it ought soon to be possible to bring
some order out of the chaos which now represents the law on this
subject.

